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1. Introduction
The Kolm triangle (see [1], Chapter 9) is a well‐known and frequently used graphical device to
visualize public good allocations in an economy with two agents (see [2], [3] and [4]). The
advantage of the Kolm triangle approach, as compared to most other graphical methods for
representing allocations in a public good economy, is that the aggregate budget constraint,
the levels of both agents’ private consumption, and the level of public good supply directly
show up in the same diagram.1 The Kolm triangle method has been particularly helpful to de‐
scribe the Nash equilibrium in the case of non‐cooperative public good provision and to com‐
pare this outcome with Pareto efficient public good allocations. Furthermore, the Kolm trian‐
gle approach facilitates the analysis of mechanisms for attaining an efficient public good allo‐
cation like the Lindahl equilibrium (see [9], [10], [11], [12] and [13]) as well as the study of pre‐
conditions and limitations faced by such mechanisms (see [14]). In this vein, we will show in
this paper, how the Kolm triangle approach can be applied to “matching”, which is another
widely discussed approach aiming at improving public good allocation.
Following the seminal work of [15], matching in a public good economy means that agents
subsidize the other agents’ direct (“flat”) public good contributions, about which the agents
decide non‐cooperatively as in the standard case of voluntary public good supply. By reducing
the effective personalized public good price of the “matched” agents, matching leads to a
Nash equilibrium with higher public good supply (see [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], and
[23]).
The objective of this paper is to show that the Kolm triangle method allows for a catchy
and intuitive graphical illustration of important features of matching mechanisms, which to a
certain extent have already been treated analytically in the literature. That the functioning of
matching schemes is quite often analyzed for public good economies with only two agents
(see [24], [8], [25] and [26]) fits well to applying the Kolm triangle approach for an analysis of
matching mechanisms.

1
The most common visualization of public good allocations in a two‐person economy uses a diagram with a
horizontal and a vertical axis, in which the public good contributions of two agents are plotted at the two axis
(see, e.g., [5], p. 154) but in which the level of public good supply does not show up directly. Alternative ap‐
proaches are the use of a triangular Edgeworth box (e.g. [6], or [7]), which has some similarities with the Kolm
triangle, or the use of a double diagram with public good supply at the vertical axis and private consumption of
two agents at the horizontal axis going to the right and to the left, respectively (e.g. [8]). In this visualization,
however, the budget constraint only appears indirectly.
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We will proceed as follows: After describing the Kolm triangle approach in Section 2, we
apply it in Section 3 to depict the changes in private consumption and public good supply that
are implied by matching when both agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the pub‐
lic good. Yet such interior matching equilibria can only be expected for specific distributions
of income between the two agents as has been shown in [27]. In Section 4, the range of in‐
come distributions, for which interiority prevails, is described in the Kolm triangle for the spe‐
cial case in which both agents have the same preferences. In Section 5, we then deal with
corner matching equilibria especially focusing on the participation constraint, i.e. on the re‐
quirement that both agents are made better off through matching as compared to the original
Nash equilibrium without matching. The fulfillment of the participation constraint, which sets
limits to the application of a matching mechanism, also depends on the income distribution.
For the description of this dependency (and its comparison with the conditions for interiority
of the matching equilibrium) the Kolm triangle also turns out to be particularly useful and
helps to present a novel contribution to the matching literature.

2. The Kolm triangle approach
We assume that there are two agents i  1, 2 with utility functions u ( i ) ( xi , G ) where xi de‐
notes agent i ’s private good consumption and G is public good supply. Both utility functions
have the standard properties, i.e. they are twice partially differentiable and strictly monotone
increasing in both variables and quasi‐concave. Moreover, the private and the public good are
assumed to be non‐inferior for agent i  1, 2 . The public good is produced by a summation
technology, for which we assume that the marginal rate of transformation between the pri‐
vate and the public good (and hence the technically given public good price) is equal to one.
If wi denotes agent i ’s initial endowment (“income”) as measured in units of the private good
an allocation ( x1 , x2 , G) thus is feasible given the aggregate endowment W  w1  w2 (and no
resources are wasted) if and only if x1  x2  G  W .
In this economy a matching mechanism is described by the two matching rates 1 and 2 .
The matching rate i  0 indicates by how much agent i subsidizes agent j ’s flat contribu‐
tion to the public good ( i, j  1, 2 ) , i.e. how much agent i has committed to add to each unit
of agent j ’s direct public good contribution. Agent i ’s total public good contribution then
3
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consists of two parts: Her direct flat contribution zi  0 , on which she decides herself, and her
indirect matching contribution  i z j , which is determined by the direct public good contribu‐
tion z j chosen by the other agent. Hence, agent i ’s budget constraint becomes
xi  zi  i z j  wi .

If both matching rates are positive, matching is bilateral or reciprocal, if only one matching
rate is positive, matching is unilateral. If 1  2  0 , we are in the standard case of voluntary
public good provision without matching. If agent j is matched by the matching rate i  0 ,
her marginal rate of transformation between the private and the public good becomes
1  i , i.e. her effective public good price falls to  j 

1
 1 . (For a description of general
1  i

matching mechanisms in a public good economy with an arbitrary number of agents see, e.g.,
[27].)
We now describe the feasible allocations and the effects of matching in the Kolm triangle

ABC , which is an equilateral triangle with height W and identical side lengths AB  AC
BC 

2
W . Each point E in this triangle represents a feasible allocation ( x1 , x2 , G) where
3

x1 is the length of the perpendicular from E to the side AB , x2 is the length of the perpen‐
dicular from E to side AC and G is the length of the perpendicular from E to the triangle’s
base side BC . A general geometric fact then implies that the sum of these barycentric coor‐
dinates sum up to the height of the equilateral triangle, i.e. that x1  x2  G  W holds and
thus the feasibility constraint is satisfied and no resources are wasted.

4
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Figure 1: The Kolm triangle method

Each point F on the base line BC of the Kolm triangle represents a distribution of the total
income between the two agents, i.e.

FC 

2
w1 BF
w1 and

. Precisely, we have BF 
w2 FC
3

2
w2 . Thus, a move of point F to the right indicates a redistribution of income from
3

agent 2 to agent 1.
In the Kolm triangle, agent 1’s indifference curves are bending downwards and convex,
while the indifference curves of agent 2 are bending upwards and convex as depicted in Figure
1 for the indifference curves running through point E . (How the indifference curves in the
Kolm triangle are obtained from the standard indifference curves in an x1 ‐ G ‐diagram is de‐
scribed in detail by [4].)

5
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3. Interior matching equilibria
After having described the Kolm triangle method in general we will use another Figure 2 to
determine which flat contribution agent 1 will choose if her income is w1 and she is matched
by the other agent with the matching rate 2  0 . (For a consideration of distorted individual
public good prices in the Kolm triangle see also [13], pp. 300 – 301.) The budget line, which
then results for agent 1, is the straight line with slope m( 2 ) :  3

1  2
running through
1  2

the endowment point F (see the Appendix for an exact derivation of the budget lines in the
Kolm triangle under matching). The point of tangency D between this budget line and an
indifference curve of agent 1 then describes this agent’s optimal allocation. There, agent 1’s
marginal rate of transformation 1   2 as induced by the matching rate 2 equals this agent’s
marginal rate of substitution between the private and the public good.

Figure 2: Expansion paths in the Kolm triangle

6
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Now assume that agent 1’s income w1 is increased so that the budget line is shifted parallel
to the right leading to the endowment point F  . As an implication of non‐inferiority of the
private and the public good, the optimum D on the new budget line lies further away both
from triangle side AB (which indicates higher demand of private consumption) and from the
triangle side BC (which indicates higher demand of the public good by agent 1). If we now
vary agent 1’s income continuously and connect all optimal points for the given matching rate

2 we obtain agent 1’s income expansion path e1 ( 2 ) . Along this path agent 1’s indifference
curves in the Kolm triangle all have the slope m(  2 )   3

1  2
, i.e. the slope of the budget
1  2

lines given 2 . Agent 1’s expansion paths start in point B and, as follows from the explanation
before, they are running northeast. The same consideration leads to expansion paths e2 ( 1 )
for agent 2, which are running northwest in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Matching equilibria

7
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2019

9

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1271 [2019]

In a matching equilibrium both agents non‐cooperatively choose their flat contributions in the
face of the given matching rates 1 and 2 , respectively. Hence, if agent i ’s flat contribution
in a matching equilibrium is positive, she must be in a position where her marginal rate of
substitution coincides with her marginal rate of transformation 1   2 as implied by matching,
which means that her equilibrium position must be on her expansion path e1 (  2 ) . Therefore,
if the matching equilibrium M  M ( 1 , 2 ) for the matching rates 1 and 2 is interior with
strictly positive flat contributions of both agents, it is represented in the Kolm triangle as the
point of intersection between the expansion paths e1 (  2 ) and e2 ( 1 ) (see Figure 3). By this
argument, the basic idea of the Aggregative Game Approach as devised by [28] is integrated
in the Kolm triangle.
It is now quite straightforward to describe in the Kolm triangle how an interior matching
equilibrium is modified through a change of the matching rates. Assume that the rate at which
agent 1’s flat contributions are matched rises from the original 2  0 to some

. Then

convexity of agent 1’s indifference curves implies that her new expansion path

lies

everywhere above e1 (  2 ) . The point of intersection

and

,

between

e2 ( 1 ) , which characterizes the new matching equilibrium, thus is located on e2 ( 1 ) north‐
west of the original matching equilibrium, so that

is further away from the triangle sides

BC and AC . Therefore, it is obvious from Figure 3 that an increase of the matching rate 2
leads to an increase both of public good supply and private consumption of agent 2, which
entails that agent 2 becomes better off. Private consumption of the matched agent 1 is re‐
duced instead. A simultaneous increase of agent 1’s matching rate 1 would clearly increase
public good supply in the matching equilibrium still further, which in Figure 3 leads to the
matching equilibrium

.

Starting from the Nash equilibrium without matching these considerations in particular
show that in the case of interior matching equilibria the introduction of a matching mechanism
mitigates the underprovision problem, actually the more the higher the matching rates are.
However, with higher matching rates the range of income distributions, for which interior
matching equilibria in fact result, is shrinking. Using the Kolm triangle, we will show this in the
next section for the special case where utility functions and matching rates are identical for
8
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both agents. This specification allows us to focus on the impact the income distribution has
on the matching equilibria, which is the central topic of this paper.

3. Interiority and the income distribution
In this section it is assumed that both agents have the same utility function u( xi , G) and that
there is reciprocal matching with the uniform matching rate   1  2 . The point of inter‐
section M (  ) between the expansion paths e1 (  ) and e2 (  ) , which represents the interior
matching equilibrium in this case, then is located on the vertical height of the Kolm triangle
(see Figure 4). The symmetric interior matching equilibrium, which results in this case, is char‐
acterized by identical private consumption levels x(  ) of both agents and public good supply
G (  ) . It follows from the analysis in Section 2 that G (  ) is increasing in the matching rate

 , so that the point M (  ) is moving upwards in the Kolm triangle when  increases. Private
consumption x(  ) 

W  G( )
then clearly is falling in the matching rate  .
2

Figure 4: Interiority zones
9
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We now show how the range of income distributions for which M (  ) actually is the interior
matching equilibrium depends on  . To this end, we first of all note that for some given
matching rate  , the minimum income wa (  ) , at which an agent starts to make a positive
flat contribution to the public good, is determined by

wa (  )  x(  ) 

(1)

G (  )
.
1 

This follows since an agent with income wa (  ) has the private consumption level x(  ) of the
interior matching equilibrium and makes no positive flat contribution by her own. Rather, she
spends the whole residual wa (  )  x(  ) for matching the other agent’s flat contribution,
which is

G(  )
. Then the matching agent is at the border of an interior solution, where noth‐
1 

ing is left over for an own positive flat contribution. Inserting x(  ) 

(2)

wa (  ) 

W  G( )
into (1) gives
2

1
1 
(W 
G( )) .
2
1 

1
1 
G(  )) . Then the matching equilibrium M (  ) is at‐
Let wa (  )  W  wa (  )  (W 
2
1 
tained for all income distributions (w1 , w2 ) leading into the interval  wa (  ), wa (  ) . Conse‐
quently, all income redistributions within this interval do not change the matching equilib‐
rium.
In Figure 4, the “interiority zone” IZ for the given matching rate    0,1 is described by
the interval  K (  ), L(  )  on the horizontal side of the Kolm triangle. The two straight lines
M (  ) K (  ) and M (  ) L (  ) that delimit the interiority zone are the budget lines for agent 1

and agent 2, respectively, which result if either agent 1 or agent 2 has the income wa (  ) and
the common matching rate is  .
For   0 , i.e. at the original Nash equilibrium without matching, we have wa (0) 
W  G (0)
 x(0) . In this case, the triangle M (0) K (0) L(0) is equilateral. At   1 , however,
2
10
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wa (1)  wa (1) 

W
 wa (0) results, so that K (1) and L (1) coincide and the interiority zone
2

degenerates to a single point. The matching rate   1 , however, is needed for attaining a
Pareto optimal outcome in the case of a uniform matching rate since only then the both
agents’ marginal rates of substitution add up to the marginal rate of transformation, i.e.

2
 1 holds so that the Samuelson condition for efficient pubic good supply is satisfied.
1 
This shows that attaining a Pareto optimal solution through matching only is possible for a
very specific distribution of income.
The transition from   0 to   1 thus makes the neutrality zone smaller in a quite ex‐
treme sense, which reflects in a descriptive and intuitive manner a general result by [27]. For
some further analysis we take the derivative of wa (  ) w.r.t.  , for which we get by letting

G(  ) 

w
G
and wa (  )  a



wa (  )  0

(3)

if

(1   )2 G( )  2G( ) .

Since G (  )  1 is bounded from above on the closed interval  0,1 , condition (3) is clearly
fulfilled if   1 is close to one so that monotonicity of wa (  ) is ensured in this region.
Condition (3) is fulfilled even on the entire interval    0,1 if, for instance, both agents
have the same symmetric preferences of the Cobb‐Douglas type, i.e. u( xi , G)  xi G . In this
special case, the expansion paths are straight lines in the Kolm triangle and G(  ) 
holds. Eq. (2) then gives wa (  ) 

wa (  ) 
we

1 
W
3 

1 
W , which is increasing for    0,1 , and
3 

2
W , which is decreasing in  . In the two extreme cases with   0 and   1 ,
3 

especially

have

wa (1)  wa (1)  G (1) 

wa (0)  G (0)  x (0) 

W
3

and

2
wa (0)  W
3

for

  0 , and

W
1
W
and x(1) 
for   1 . For   as an example of an intermedi‐
2
2
4

1
3
1
4
ate value of the matching rate we get wa ( )  W  0.43W and wa ( )  W  0.57W .
2
7
2
7
11
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As long as the income distribution is in the interiority zone the participation constraint for
the matching mechanism is automatically satisfied, i.e. for any matching rate  with 0    1
both agents are better off in the matching equilibrium M (  ) than in the original Nash equi‐
librium M (0) . This follows since in the symmetrical situation considered here both agents
have higher utility in the Pareto optimal outcome M (1) than in M (0) . Therefore, in Figure 4
M (1) and henceforth the entire segment M (0) M (1) of matching equilibria for    0,1 lies

in the lens, which is made up by the agents’ indifference curves through M (0) . This confirms
that the participation constraint is satisfied for interior matching equilibria in the special case
considered here. For corner solutions, in which only one agent makes a strictly positive flat
contribution to the public good, this, however, no longer needs to be true even when prefer‐
ences and matching rates are identical. This will be shown in the next section.

5. Corner solutions
We now assume that the income distribution lies outside the interiority zone, i.e. that agent
1’s income w1 exceeds wa (  ) and, consequently, agent 2’s income w2 falls below wa (  ) .
Then only agent 1 will make a positive flat contribution while agent 2 is only indirectly con‐
tributing to the public good by subsidizing agent 1. In Figure 5, the endowment point F then
lies right to L(  ) . The corner matching equilibrium Q (  ) , which is obtained as the point of
intersection between agent 1’s budget line with slope m(  )   3

1 
with her expansion
1 

path e1 (  ) , is located northeast to M (  ) . In Q (  ) public good supply and utility of agent 1
hence are higher than in M (  ) . (See [29], for an analysis of corner matching equilibria in the
general case with n agents.)

12
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Figure 5: A corner equilibrium

Since agent 1 thus has higher utility in M (  ) than in the original Nash equilibrium M (0) the
participation constraint is automatically fulfilled for agent 1 in Q (  ) . But if the deviation from
the interiority zone is not too large, i.e. F is not too far away from L(  ) , agent 2 is also better
off in Q (  ) than in M (0) . By a continuity argument this simply follows since agent 2 is better
off in M (  ) than in M (0) .
For an exact description of agent 2’s participation incentives in the Kolm triangle let P2 be
the point, at which the expansion path e1 (  ) of agent 1 intersects agent 2’s indifference curve
through M (0) (see Figure 6). Agent 2 then is better off in the corner matching equilibrium
than in the standard Nash equilibrium when the matching equilibrium lies on the segment
M (  ) P2 of e1 (  ) , which results when the endowment point is located between L(  ) and
Lˆ (  ) . If, however, the income of agent 1 is so high (and agent 2’s income correspondingly

so low) that the matching equilibrium lies north‐east of P1 , agent 2 attains lower utility in the
matching equilibrium than in the original Nash equilibrium. Then the participation constraint
13
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is violated. The participation incentives for agent 1 are described by a completely analogous
reasoning, which leads to the point P1 on agent 2’s expansion path e2 (  ) and to the point
Kˆ (  ) on the triangle side BC . Consequently, the range of income distributions for which the

participation constraint holds for both agents thus is visualized in Figure 6 by the interval
Kˆ (  ) Lˆ (  ) on the triangle side BC , which corresponds to an interval of income distributions

 wb ( ), wb ( ) .

Figure 6: Comparison between the interiority and the participation zone

It is a direct consequence of the monotonicity of expansion paths that P1 lies to the left and
P2 to the right of M (  ) . This implies that for any given    0,1 the “participation zone”
PZ  Kˆ (  ) Lˆ (  ) is larger than the interiority zone IZ  K (  ) L (  ) , i.e. wb ( )  wa ( ) and

wb ( )  wa ( ) holds. Hence, the requirements for income distributions for satisfying interi‐
ority of a matching equilibrium are more challenging than the requirements for satisfying the
participation constraint.
14
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In the special case where both agents have the same Cobb‐Douglas utility function

u( xi , G)  xi G for a given  we can explicitly determine the critical value wb (  ) for any

   0,1 from the condition
W2
wb (  )
.
(W  wb (  )  
)(1   ) wb (  ) 
9
2

(4)

The left hand side of (4) gives agent 2’s utility when she is in P2 (where her income is

w2  W  wb (  ) ), where she matches agent 1’s flat contribution

wb (  )
with the matching
2

rate  while the right hand side gives agent 2’s utility in the Nash equilibrium without match‐
ing where x(0)  G (0) 

(5)

wb (  ) 

W
. Solving the quadratic equation in (4) yields
3

W
1 1  5
(1 
)
2
3 1 

and wb (  ) 

For the special value of intermediate matching  

W
1 1  5
(1   
).
2 
3 1 

1
1
we in particular have wb ( )  0.4W
2
2

1
and wb ( )  0.6W . This confirms that in this example the participation zone is larger than the
2

interiority zone as graphically described by Figure 6 for the general case.
It generally holds that for the matching rate   1 the participation zone Kˆ (1) Lˆ (1) is a non‐
degenerate interval while the interiority zone collapses into a straight line in this case.

6. Conclusion
It is well‐known that in a public goods economy matching of public good contributions can
successfully be employed to increase public good supply and to achieve a Pareto improvement
over the conventional non‐cooperative Nash equilibrium. In this paper, it has been shown how
the Kolm triangle method can be used to visualize important effects of matching in an elegant
way, so basically the increase of public good supply through matching – be it unilateral or
reciprocal. We describe in a quite intuitive way, how in a special situation (with identical pref‐
erences and identical matching rates) the interiority of matching equilibria depends on the
15
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income distribution and especially, how the “interiority zone”, i.e. the range of income distri‐
butions leading to an interior matching equilibrium, is shrinking when the matching rate in‐
creases. Moreover, we were able to delimit the “participation zone” in the Kolm triangle, i.e.
the set of income distributions, for which the matching equilibrium becomes Pareto‐superior
to the original Nash equilibrium so that agents voluntarily enter the matching scheme. In this
context, an important and novel insight has been that the participation zone is larger than the
interiority zone, which means that also corner matching equilibria in which only one agent
makes a positive flat contribution to the public good may make both agents better off. How
this welfare effect can be generalized to the case of different utility functions and matching
rates will be an issue of future research.

Appendix
We assume that agent 1 contributes some d   0, w1  units of her endowment w1 to the public
good. Then, her new position must be on a parallel to the Kolm triangle side AB whose dis‐
tance to the endowment point F is d . Given the matching rate 2  0 , agent 1’s new posi‐
tion must lie on a parallel to BC at the same time, which is (1  2 )d units away from this
side of the Kolm triangle. The new position thus is given as the point of intersection between
these two parallels, which is point T in Figure 7.

16
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Figure 7: The slope of budget lines under matching

The budget line for the given matching rate 2 then is the straight line FT in Figure 7 (on
which point D of Figure 2 in the main text indicates agent 1’s optimal choice). To determine
the slope m( 2 ) of this budget line we first note that RF 

(1  2 )d (1  2 )d

, which gives
tan 60
3


SF  RF  RS 

2d
d

sin 60
3

(1  2 )d
. Then
3

and RS 

m(2 )   tan 

1  2
ST
 3
.
1  2
SF
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